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I. INTRODUCTION
"The [Individuals with Disabilities] Act requires that the . . .schools
provide the educational equivalent of a serviceable Chevrolet . . . [and]
[a]ppellant, however, demands that the... school system provide a Cadillac
. . ." stated the Court in Doe v. Board of Education of Tullahoma City
Schools.' In so doing, the Tullahoma Court explained why the Individuals
1. 9 F.3d 455,459 (6th Cir 1993).
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 2 which benefits special needs
children, was not applicable to the gifted yet disabled child. But why must a
child be provided with either a Chevy or a Cadillac? Why can't the gifted
disabled child be treated appropriately to his or her needs-both gifted and
disabled?
Throughout the evolution of United States education law, the goal of
both legislators and educators has been to balance the needs of the child, the
needs of society and the benefits a successful education can create for all
parties. The government, at both the state and federal levels, has made
great strides to improve the educational experiences for all children.
Specifically, they have enacted extensive legislation to strengthen the
educational rights of disabled children through the enactment of both the
IDEA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 4 Additionally,
although the rights of the disabled student are considerably more far-
reaching than the rights of gifted students, for more than thirty years
Congress has recognized and acknowledged a need to supply gifted children
with an enhanced educational experience.' More recently, the federal
government reasserted its commitment to education by enacting the No
Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB"), ushering in sweeping changes to
education in order to "close the achievement gap with accountability,
flexibility, and choice, so that no child is left behind." 6
However, despite the federal government's attempts to improve
education for all of America's students, one group in particular seems to be
caught in a struggle for how to best satisfy their distinctive needs. These
children are known as the "twice-exceptional" children.7 They are gifted
and highly intelligent. Yet, they have some type of disability that prevents
them from reaching their potential. They may have a physical disability,
such as deafness, blindness or cerebral palsy. Or, they may have a learning
disability such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") or
dyslexia. 8 Or, they may have an emotional disability such as anxiety or
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1419 (2004) [hereinafter IDEA 04]. The Act the court referred to in
Tullahoma is the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(1975) [hereinafter EAHCA], which is the precursor to the IDEA. See infra note 45 and
accompanying text.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) [hereinafter RA504]; see also infra Part II.B.2.
5. See SIDNEY MARLAND, EDUCATION OF THE GIFTED AND TALENTED: REPORT To CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE U.S. COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION (1972) [hereinafter THE
MARLAND REPORT]; see also infra Part II.C.
6. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, 1425 (2002) [hereinafter NCLB]. The stated purpose of
NCLB is "to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-
quality education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement
standards and state academic assessments." Id. § 1001, 115 Stat. at 1439.
7. See infra Part 111.
8. Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") is defined as "a persistent pattern of
inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that is . . . typically observed in individuals at a
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conduct disorder. 9 Some may even have multiple disorders, comprised of
any conceivable combination of physical, learning and emotional
disorders-all of which seriously impede their ability to function and
perform in the traditional classroom. Yet, as previously mentioned, they are
intellectually gifted and likely bored and/or frustrated by the pace and
structure of the traditional classroom, much less any remedial programming
that might take place in a standard special education program. 0
comparable level of development . . .." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 85 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. The
disorder is manifested in social situations, as well as academic and occupational situations. Id.
Generally, symptoms of hyperactivity are fidgetiness, squirming, inappropriate running and
climbing, and inability to remain seated. Id. at 86. Impulsivity is manifested by impatience,
frequent interruptions, and difficulty in delaying responses. Id. ADHD is frequently defined in
subgroups of ADHD, Combined Type (both attention deficit and hyperactive behavior), ADHD,
Predominantly Inattentive, and ADHD, Predominantly Hyperactive-Impulsive. Id. at 87. The
International Dyslexia Association has defined dyslexia as "a neurologically based . . . disorder
which interferes with the acquisition and processing of language. Varying in degrees of severity, it
is manifested by difficulties in receptive and expressive language, including phonological
processing, in reading, writing, spelling, handwriting, and sometimes in arithmetic." DAPHNE M.
HURFORD, To READ OR NOT TO READ: ANSWERS TO ALL YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT DYSLEXIA 36-
37 (First Touchstone ed. 1999).
9. Anxiety Disorder is a general term encompassing a wide variety of distinct disorders such as:
1) Panic Attack (sudden onset of "intense apprehension, fearfulness, or terror"); 2) Specific Phobia
(significant anxiety generated by exposure to a specific feared object or situation); 3) Social Phobia
(significant anxiety brought about by exposure to "social or performance situations"); 4) Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder ("obsessions (which cause marked anxiety or distress) and/or by compulsions
(which serve to neutralize anxiety)"); and 5) Generalized Anxiety Disorder (persistent anxiety or
distress lasting at least six months). DSM-IV-TR, supra note 8, at 429. Conduct disorder, which
can range from mild, to moderate to severe, is defined as "a repetitive and persistent pattern of
behavior in which the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are
violated." Id. at 93. Primary diagnostic criterions for conduct disorder are: 1) aggression towards
people and/or animals; 2) destruction of property; 3) theft and deceitfulness; and 4) serious
violations of rules. Id. at 98-99.
10. It is additionally important to recognize that children, in general, have different areas of
strengths and weaknesses and different learning styles. Dr. Mel Levine has identified eight distinct
learning "systems" that feed into the mind's overall "Neurodevelopmental System" which works as
different skills and tools that enable the child to learn. MEL LEVINE, M.D., A MIND AT A TIME 28-30
(2002). Dr. Levine's eight systems are: 1) Attention Control System (working as the "administrative
bureau of the brain" to regulate, control and distribute the "mental energy" necessary to learn); 2)
Memory System (the mind's ability to remember - either in short term memory, active working
memory, or long term memory - the vast amounts of knowledge and facts required to succeed in
school); 3) Language System (a broad based system comprised of the ability to decode and
recognize language sounds, understanding various vocabulary concepts, mastering expressive and
written language skills, and written and spoken comprehension); 4) Spatial Ordering System (the
ability to "deal with or create information arranged in a gestalt, a visual pattern, or a configuration"
so that the child can understand how things "fit together" to form recognizable patterns and shapes);
5) Sequential Ordering System (the ability to comprehend "chains of information" in a sequentially
organized pattern); 6) Motor System (comprised of both fine motor skills and gross motor skills, this
system is "supposed to govern the very precise and complex network of tight connections between
the brain and various muscles all over the body"); 7) Higher Thinking System ("the ability to
457
Regrettably for these students, many will be forced to choose between
services for special education and services for gifted education. This is true,
in large part, because the United States Supreme Court has held that the
school's responsibility for special education under the IDEA is to deliver
services "reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks
and advance from grade to grade."'" Obviously, an intellectually gifted
child, despite his or her disability, is capable of far more than simply
achieving passing marks and advancing to the next grade. Thus, pursuant to
the Supreme Court's holding, under the IDEA the gifted and disabled learner
is not fully able to benefit from the educational services offered.
Furthermore, a large percentage of twice-exceptional students will not
receive any services because, as this comment will show, they will never be
identified as either gifted or disabled and subsequently, will not qualify for
any special services.' 2 In what is perhaps the most ironic twist in the tale of
these children, the current iteration of the gifted education statute (which is
currently included as a subsection of NCLB) expressly dictates that a large
portion of the funding for servicing gifted children is designated to
specifically search for and include the gifted/disabled learner within the
gifted program. 13
Part II of this comment sets forth the history of federal education law,
and the history and evolution of special education law and gifted education
law. 14 Part III defines and discusses the twice-exceptional child, including
the educational experiences and legal dilemmas confronted by these children
and their families. ' 5 Part IV discusses the legal choices and approaches
families of twice-exceptional children have in trying to best accommodate
their children's educational needs. 16 Part V concludes the comment. 17
problem-solve and reason logically, to form and make use of concepts . . . to understand how and
when rules apply, and to get the point of a complicated idea."); and 8) Social Thinking System (the
ability to act or perform appropriately in social situations and to correctly understand and interpret
social queues and norms). Id. at 30-35, 92. Furthermore, a child's ability to learn is impacted by
their "Neurodevelopmental Profile" which is comprised of genetic factors, environmental influences,
temperament/emotional factors, family factors, influence of peers, cultural values, educational
experiences and the child's physical health. Id. at 42. Taking all of these elements together, both
parents and educators can then recognize the child's various areas of strengths and weakness and use
this information to structure the child's academic experience for success. Id. at 299-300.
11. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204 (1982).
12. See infra Part III.
13. See NCLB, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 5465, 115 Stat. 1425, 1828 (2002).
14. See infra notes 18-105 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 106-55 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 156-203 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
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II. HISTORY OF EDUCATION LAW
A. General Education
Although most, if not all state constitutions contain a state
constitutionally recognized right to education,' 8 there is no such federal
constitutional right.19 However, where public education is provided by the
State, the United States Supreme Court has defined narrow categories of
people worthy of special constitutional protections on education: specifically
race, gender, and alienage.20
In the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme
Court held that racial segregation of public school students violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 2' The Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
18. See Roni R. Reed, Education and the State Constitutions: Alternatives for Suspended and
Expelled Students, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 582, 582 (1996) (explaining that all state constitutions have
an education clause and that most of these clauses have been found to create a fundamental right to
education). See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (holding education is a
fundamental interest); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)
(finding the right to an adequate education is fundamental); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313
(Minn. 1993) (holding education is a fundamental right); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703
A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (holding that a constitutionally adequate public education is a
fundamental right); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997) (holding the state constitution
guarantees the right to an education); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256
(N.D. 1994) (finding education is a fundamental right); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138,
142 (Va. 1994) (holding education is a fundamental right); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W.
Va. 1979) (holding education is a fundamental constitutional right).
19. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding education is
not a right afforded protection under the United States Constitution); see also infra notes 176-79 and
accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 556 (1996) [hereinafter VMI] (applying
constitutional protections in the area of gender); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (applying
constitutional protections in the area of alienage); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
(applying constitutional protections to education in the area of race). See generally, PERRY A.
ZIRKEL, ET AL. A DIGEST OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AFFECTING EDUCATION (2001)
[hereinafter Zirkel, DIGEST] (presenting a thorough accounting and summary of United States
Supreme Court cases affecting education).
21. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. Brown, one of the seminal cases in both civil rights and
education law was part of a group of five cases brought by students residing in Kansas, South
Carolina, Virginia and Delaware. Id. at 486. In all of the states, the issue concerned the
constitutionality of the segregated education of black and white students generated by the Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) ruling of "separate but equal." Brown, 347 U.S. at 488. The Brown
Court overruled Plessy and held, "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal'
has no place." Id. at 495.
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great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society ... [I]t is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.22
In Plyler v. Doe, the Court held that discrimination based on alienage,
absent a "substantial state interest," violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.23
And finally, in United States v. Virginia ("VMI"), the Supreme Court
held that discrimination in public education based upon gender, although not
worthy of strict scrutiny review, was nonetheless subject to a standard of
"exceedingly persuasive justification., 24 The Court found that the State did
not meet this standard under the Virginia statute that forbade women from
enrolling at the Virginia Military Institute.25 Thus, discrimination based on
gender was also found to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause absent such a justification. 6
Moreover, in addition to the decisions in the federal courts, the Federal
Government has influenced state education policies through various federal
funding grants. One of the first and most influential of these was the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA 65",),27 which
granted the states federal funding for education, provided that the state's
educational agencies complied with specific directives promulgated by the
federal government.2 8 Congress has continued to influence the state's
education policies with a variety of funding measures affecting a wide
assortment of programs, including but not limited to, school performance,
treatment of disadvantaged students, testing methods and measures, special
education, and gifted education.2 9
22. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
23. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. The question addressed in Plyler was whether or not children of
Mexican nationals who had entered the country illegally were entitled to the same free public
education offered to children of American citizens or legally admitted aliens. Id. at 205-06.
Although the Court reiterated its position that education was not a fundamental right, it nonetheless
held that the State had not met its burden of showing a substantial state interest as a justification to
deny the children access to public education. Id. at 230; see also infra notes 140-142 and
accompanying text.
24. VMI, 518 U.S. at 533-34. The Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"), which was established in
1839 and had an impressive record of "producing leaders," was the "sole single-sex school among
Virginia's 15 public institutions of higher learning." Id. at 520. Accordingly, women desirous of the
services and educational opportunities offered by the school initiated litigation alleging a violation of
their equal protection rights. Id. at 523.
25. Id. at 533-34.
26. Id. at 534.
27. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
[hereinafter ESEA 65].
28. See James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 932, 937 (2004); see also ESEA 65; Chemerinsky, infra note 47, at 204.
29. See, e.g., ESEA 65 (requiring schools to meet specific standards with regards to remedial and
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B. Origin and Evolution of Special Education Law
1. Case Law
Early court cases regarding education for disabled students were not
particularly favorable to the students. Rather, disabled students were
deemed to be a distraction to the teachers and fellow students, and were
banished from the classroom and either institutionalized or ignored.3 °
However, just as Brown v. Board of Education31 sparked an equal protection
interest in education with regards to race, it also opened the door to an equal
protection interest in favor of education services for the disabled, as the
courts soon realized that disabled students were being denied equal
protection as well.32 The legacy of Brown could be seen, for example, in
disadvantaged students); Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175
(1970) [hereinafter EHA] (initiating an attempt to provide services to disabled youngsters); EAHCA,
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (creating a more comprehensive program for the nation's disabled
students); Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat. 1103,
1142 (1990) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1990)) [hereinafter IDEA 90] (further expanding and
defining the goals and procedures to provide educational services to disabled youth); Jacob K. Javits
Gifted and Talented Students Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 10201, 108 Stat. 3518,
3820 (1994) [hereinafter Javits 94] (creating a program to increase educational services to the
nation's gifted and talented students); Improving America's School's Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994) [hereinafter IASA] (revising the ESEA to improve educational standards
and testing policies for all students); NCLB, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (the federal
government's latest attempt at a comprehensive education program geared at bridging the education
gap between the nation's poor and the nation's affluent neighborhoods and students); see also infra
notes 34-105 and accompanying text. With the exception of the IDEA, this comment cites to session
laws for all statutes in order to avoid confusion to the reader.
30. See Watson v. City of Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 864 (Mass. 1893) (holding that the child was
validly excluded from school because "he is so weak in mind as not to derive any marked benefit
from instruction, and, further, that he is troublesome to other children, making unusual noises,
pinching others, etc. He is also found unable to take ordinary, decent, physical care of himself.");
Beattie v. Bd. of Educ., 172 N.W. 153, 154-55 (Wis. 1919) (holding that because his "physical
condition and ailment produce[d] a depressing and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school
children; [and] that by reason of his physical condition he [took] up an undue portion of the teacher's
time and attention, [and] distract[ed] the attention of other pupils," he was rightfully excluded from
participation in public education.).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. See LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 36 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining that the
"theory underlying the mainstreaming goal [of special education] includes the 'separate is not equal'
principle of Brown v. Board of Education."); H. RUTHERFORD TURNBULL III, FREE APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE LAW AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 59-60 (1986) [hereinafter
Turnbull, FAPE] (explaining that "right-to-education" cases post-Brown "expanded Brown 's equal
opportunities doctrine by establishing that the exclusion of handicapped children from any
opportunities to learn ... is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause"). But see Perry A.
Zirkel, Does Brown v. Board of Education Play a Prominent Role in Special Education Law? 34 J.L.
& EDUC. 255, 269-71 (2005) [hereinafter Zirkel, Brown] (stating that Brown is "more like a distant
1971 when the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a consent decree, stating inter alia, "[h]aving
undertaken to provide a free public education to all of its children, including
its exceptional children, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may not deny
any mentally retarded child access to a free public program of education and
training.,
33
2. Statutes
a. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Congress expanded civil rights to protect the disabled with the passage
of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 3 Specifically, Section 504
states: "no otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States.
. . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 35 Thus, in order
to remain eligible to receive federal funding for education, states and school
districts were required to comply with the Act's mandates regarding
nondiscrimination towards disabled students.36 Put simply, if a student was
capable of completing the curriculum "but for" the disability, because of the
protections created by Section 504, the school. could not discriminate against
him or her because of the disability.
relative" to special education considerations because: 1) most post Brown cases have been statutory
interpretation decisions, rather than the constitutional interpretations that were the basis for Brown;
2) Brown, as a race-based decision was held to the strict scrutiny standard of constitutional review,
which is not the standard of review in disability cases; 3) "Brown represents an equality version,
whereas the IDEA is more an equity version, of equal opportunity;" and 4) in contrast to Brown,
which rejected "separate but equal" and resulted in desegregation, IDEA's least restrictive
environment (LRE) goal "include[s] separate, special classes."); see also infra notes 68-73 and
accompanying text.
33. Pa. Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
see also, Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 872 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding "no child eligible for a
publicly supported education . . . shall be excluded from a regular public school assignment . . .
unless such child is provided (a) adequate alternative educational services suited to the child's needs,
which may include special education or tuition grants, and (b) a constitutionally adequate prior
hearing ... ").
34. See Jennifer R. Rowe, High School Exit Exams Meet IDEA - An Examination of the History,
Legal Ramifications, and Implications for Local School Administrators and Teachers, 2004 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 75, 79 (2004); see also RA504, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat 355 (1973).
35. RA504 § 504.
36. See Rowe, supra note 34, at 80; see also PERRY A. ZIRKEL, SECTION 504 STUDENT ISSUES,
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, AND PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2005) [hereinafter Zirkel,
RECOMMENDATIONS].
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b. The Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA'), The Education for
All Handicapped Children Act ("EAHCA ") and The Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA )3
Congress first attempted to provide better educational services to
disabled students in 1970 when it passed the Education of the Handicapped
Act. 38 The Act authorized the Commissioner of Education to make grants to
the states for the purpose of "assisting the States in the initiation, expansion,
and improvement of programs and projects for the education of handicapped
children at the preschool, elementary school, and secondary school levels."'3 9
The Act also authorized the Commissioner to, among other things, make
grants regarding research of education for the disabled, teacher training, and
to establish a fifteen member National Advisory Committee on Handicapped
Children as part of the Office of Education.40
However, when the EHA did not result in the desired protections for
disabled students, Congress broadened the protections even more in 1975
with the passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
("EAHCA"). 4' The EAHCA created a source of federal funding for special
education, and placed specific restrictions upon the states as conditions for
receiving such funding.42 Congressional intent with the enactment of the
EAHCA was to allow disabled children access to education and access to
due process of law.43 Before the EAHCA's passage, millions of disabled
children were denied an education because: "(A) the children did not receive
appropriate educational services; (B) the children were excluded entirely
from the public school system ... (C) undiagnosed disabilities prevented the
children from having a successful educational experience; [and] (D) a lack
of adequate resources within the public school system forced families to find
services [elsewhere]." 44  The EAHCA, which established the current
37. EHA, Pub. L. No. 91-230 § 601, 84 Stat. 121,175 (1970); EAHCA, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (1975); IDEA 04, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1419 (2004).
38. See EHA § 601.
39. Id. § 601, 84 Stat. at 178.
40. Id. § 601, 84 Stat. at 177, 184, 187.
41. See EAHCA, 89 Stat. 773.
42. See Rowe, supra note 34, at 81. In order to receive federal funds, states were required to
submit a plan showing how the state's policies regarding special education complied with the
requirements set forth in the EAHCA. Id. Initially, all states except New Mexico submitted plans
that complied with the Act. Id. Unfortunately for New Mexico, the provisions of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 required the states to provide a free and appropriate education for
disabled students regardless of each state's adoption of the EAHCA. Id. Accordingly, New Mexico
agreed to comply with Act as well. Id.
43. PETER D. WRIGHT & PAMELA D. WRIGHT, WRIGHT's LAW: IDEA 2004 30 n. 10 (2005).
44. IDEA 04, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2).
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framework for special education law, was broadened in scope yet again in
order to more adequately deal with the needs of disabled students and was
renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA 90") in
1990. 45 Proving the federal government's commitment to special education
was still strong, Congress recently reauthorized the IDEA in 2004 ("IDEA
04").46
States may elect whether or not to adopt the IDEA, but in order to
receive federal funding for education, the state must agree to accept and
implement the IDEA's provisions. 7 Because every state wishes to receive
federal funds for education and every state adopted IDEA 90, it is likely that
all states will adopt IDEA 04 as well.
IDEA 04 is an expansive act with multiple components. The Act's
stated purpose is "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available
to them a free appropriate public education [("FAPE")] that emphasizes
special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs
and prepare them for further education, employment and independent
living., 48  Several key components of the IDEA, such as "disabled child,"
"free appropriate public education," "individualized education program,"
"related services" and "special education" are specifically defined within the
Act.49 IDEA 04 defines a child with a disability as a child with one of
several enumerated conditions5" "who, by reason thereof, needs special
education and related services." 5' Additionally, IDEA 04 defines special
education as, "specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, to
meet the unique needs of a child with a disability.,
5 2
45. IDEA 90, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat. 1103, 1142 (1990).
46. See IDEA 04, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-19. IDEA 04 is substantially the same as IDEA 90, but
there are a few notable changes, including but not limited to: 1) an increased focus on accountability
for the districts and an attempt to bring the teacher qualification requirements, research based
instruction rules, and research methods into conformity with the requirements promulgated by
NCLB; 2) changing parental involvement to include "strengthening the role and responsibility of
parents;" 3) adding 'further education' to the goals of the IDEA; and 4) requiring children identified
as disabled to participate in all state and district assessments, albeit with any and all appropriate
accommodations as needed by the child. WRIGHT, supra note 43, at 30-33.
47. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 204 (1997)
(explaining that the Supreme Court held in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1992),
that "although Congress cannot directly compel state legislative or regulatory action, it can induce
behavior by putting conditions on grants.").
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d).
49. 20 U.S.C. § 1401. There are actually thirty-six defined terms within the Act, but it is not
necessary to address all of the terms in this discussion. For a complete list of expressly defined
terms for use within IDEA 04, see 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1)-(36).
50. Id. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (stating "[t]he term 'child with a disability' means a child (i) with mental
retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual
impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . . orthopedic impairments,
autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific leaming disabilities.").
51. Id. § 1401(3)(A)(ii).
52. Id. § 1401(29).
464
[Vol. 34: 455, 2007] An Argument for Cadillacs Instead of Chevrolets
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
In general, the statute noted that the adoption of IDEA 04 and its
provisions generates a benefit for society for several reasons most notably
that by fulfilling the stated purpose of IDEA 04, the disabled student grows
into an adult that is capable of self-sufficiency, employment, and further
education.5 3 This, of course, eliminates the need for society to take care of
the individual by enabling the individual to care for him or herself and to
become a fully productive member of society.1
4
IDEA 04 is comprised of six distinct principles which govern the State's
actions regarding special education.55
The first of these principles is the principle of Zero Reject. 56 Zero
Reject holds that all students must be provided a free and appropriate
education, regardless of disabilities.57 This provision holds true even if the
child is suspended or expelled for discipline problems, as long as the child's
behavior which resulted in the discipline is a manifestation of the child's
disability.58
The second principle addressed by IDEA 04 is that of
Nondiscriminatory Evaluation. 9 Prior to the provision of special education
services, the state or local education agency must conduct a "full and
individual initial evaluation., 60  The evaluation must be conducted within
sixty days of receipt of parental consent for the evaluation, and must "use a
variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant functional,
53. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d).
54. See S. REP. No. 94-455 (1975) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that "[tihe Senate bill and the House
amendments find that it is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local
efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children.").
55. H. Rutherford Turnbull, III, et al., IDEA, Positive Behavioral Supports, and School Safety, 30
J.L. & EDUC. 445, 447 (2001) [hereinafter Tumbull, IDEA].
56. See id.
57. Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l)(A).
58. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k). The school "may remove a child with a disability who violates a
code of student conduct" and either place the child in an alternative educational setting and/or
suspend the child for a period of not more than ten days. Id. § 1415(k)(l)(B). Further, "a child with
a disability who is removed from the child's current placement under subparagraph (G) (irrespective
of whether the behavior is determined to be a manifestation of the child's disability) or subparagraph
(C) shall (i) continue to receive educational services as provided in section 1412(a)(1) of this title."
Id. § 1415(k)(1)(D). However, if the suspension lasts for more than ten days and the school
determines that the behavior is not a manifestation of the child's disability, the school may treat the
child as if the child was not disabled, and may, as necessary, expel or suspend the child and will not
be required to supply FAPE. Id. § 1415(k)(1)(E). If, however, the behavior is found to be a
manifestation of the disability, and the suspension exceeds ten days in duration, the district must
continue to offer FAPE and its related services, in addition to "functional behavioral assessment,
behavioral intervention services and modifications, that are designed to address the behavior
violation so that it does not recur." Id. § 1415(k)(l)(D).
59. See Turnbull, IDEA, supra note 55, at 447.
60. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A).
465
developmental, and academic information, including information provided
by the parent, that may assist in determining (i) whether the child is a child
with a disability; and (ii) the content of the child's individualized education
program."' 6  Additionally, the assessment and the evaluation materials used
may not be "discriminatory on a racial or cultural basis" and must be
"administered in the language and form most likely to yield accurate
information on what the child knows and can do academically,
developmentally, and functionally, unless it is not feasible. 62
The third principle is that of Free and Appropriate Education.63 Free
appropriate public education ("FAPE") is:
special education and related services 64 that (A) have been provided
at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational
agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or
secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are
provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section 1414(d) of this title.65
As a result, each disabled child that is subject to the provisions of the
IDEA is to be given an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") which is
defined as, "a written statement for each child with a disability that is
developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with section 1414(d) of this
title."'66 Thus, the "linchpin" of the IDEA is the IEP that is tailored to the
61. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i), (b)(2)(A).
62. Id. § 1414(b)(3)(A).
63. See Turnbull, IDEA, supra note 55, at 448.
64. The Act defines "related services" as "transportation, and such developmental, corrective and
other supportive services ... as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from
special education." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26). The Act further defines "other supportive services" as
"speech-language pathology and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological services,
physical and occupational therapy, recreation ... social work services, school nurse services ...
counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services, and
medical services, except that medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only."
Id. at § 1401(26)(A).
65. Id. § 1401(9).
66. Id. § 1401(14). The Act defines an IEP as a written document developed by the IEP Team,
which is comprised of the child's parents, at least one regular education teacher of the child, at least
one special education teacher, a representative of the local education agency, an individual who can
interpret and evaluate the educational implications of various education evaluations, any experts the
agency or the child's parent wish to include, and whenever appropriate, the disabled child. 20
U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(B). The document must then address the following: 1) the child's "present
levels of academic achievement and functional performance;" 2) "a statement of measurable annual
goals, including academic and functional goals;" 3) a "description of how the child's progress ...
will be measured;" 4) a statement defining which special education supplementary aids and supports
will be necessary for the child's academic success; 5) an explanation describing to what extent "the
child will not participate with non-disabled children in the regular class;" 6) a statement of any
accommodations necessary for the child's academic achievement; 7) the projected start date for the
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unique needs of the child so as to ensure the best educational experience in
order to facilitate the ultimate IDEA goals of education, employment and
independent living.67
The fourth principle addressed by IDEA 04 is that of Least Restrictive
Environment ("LRE").68  LRE holds that "[t]o the maximum extent
appropriate, children with disabilities.., are educated with children who are
not disabled., 69  The primary objective of LRE is to include disabled
children with non-disabled children so as to promote inclusion for the
benefit of both the disabled and non-disabled child.70 The disabled child
benefits from inclusion because he can model behaviors and abilities from
the non-disabled students, and the non-disabled student benefits by both
exposure to and tolerance of diversity.7 1 Furthermore, the IDEA provides
for supplemental aids and services in order to accommodate the disabled
student's additional needs in the regular classroom. 72 The concept of LRE
exists within a continuum that ranges from full inclusion in the regular
classroom to a completely segregated environment for the disabled child,
with the ultimate goal of placing the child in the environment that is most
similar to the environment of the non-disabled child.73
commencement of services; 8) the "anticipated frequency, location and duration of services;" and 9)
a statement of "appropriate measurable postsecondary goals based on age appropriate transition
assessments" (once the disabled child reaches the age of sixteen). Id. § 1414(d)(l)(A).
67. See Turnbull, IDEA, supra note 55, at 448.
68. See id.
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5).
70. See Rowe, supra note 34, at 84. The courts have generally seen LRE as a means toward
mainstreaming disabled children with non-disabled children, viewing the phrases of "to the
maximum extent appropriate" and "are educated with children who are not disabled" as dispositive
of the Act's intentions. Anne Proffitt Dupre, Disability and the Public Schools: The Case Against
"Inclusion," 72 WASH. L. REv. 775, 794-97 (1997). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not
defined the LRE element and/or how to test if a school has fulfilled this requirement of the IDEA.
Id. at 795; see also Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 498 (7th Cir. 2002); Kathryn E. Crossley,
Inclusion: A New Addition to Remedy a History of Inadequate Conditions and Terms, 4 WASH.
U.J.L. & POL'Y 239, 252 (2000); Sarah E. Farley, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing
Classroom Placement of Students with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 77 WASH. L. REV. 809, 809
(2002).
71. See Rowe, supra note 34, at 84.
72. See Turnbull, IDEA, supra note 55, at 448-49.
73. See Dupre, supra note 70, at 792-93; see also Richard Tompkins & Pat Deloney, Sw. Educ.
Dev. Lab, Inclusion: The Pros and Cons, ISSUES... ABOUT CHANGE, Vol. 4, No. 3, http://www.
sedl.org/change/issues/issues43.html.
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The fifth principle is that of Procedural Due Process.74 Under IDEA 04,
students with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed specific procedural
safeguards to ensure the provision of FAPE to the disabled student.75
Included in these procedures are opportunities for the parents to: 1) examine
all of their child's educational records; 2) participate in all meetings
regarding educational matters such as evaluations, placement and
programming; 3) obtain an independent educational evaluation ("lEE") at
district expense; 4) receive prior written notice of any changes to the
student's programming; 5) receive all district notifications in the "native
language of the parents, unless it clearly is not feasible;" and 6) submit a
complaint and/or participate in mediation and/or due process. 76
Lastly, the sixth principle is Parent and Student Participation.77 Many
of the provisions stipulated in IDEA 04 include the involvement of the
disabled student's parents, and, when appropriate, the disabled student him
or herself. For example, in addition to the parental notification provisions,
IDEA 04 requires that: 1) the initial evaluation of an IEP can be initiated
upon request of either the State Agency or the parent, and special education
services cannot be conducted if the parent refuses consent;78 2) the IEP
Team is comprised of a group containing "the parents of a child with a
disability; ' 79 3) when the IEP is developed, the team must consider "the
concerns of the parents for enhancing the education of their child;" 80 and 4)
the IEP must be periodically reviewed in order to address, inter alia,
"information about the child provided to, or by, the parents." 81
C. Origin and Evolution of Gifted Education Law
Many scholars credit the Russian launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957
as the true impetus for the United States' foray into gifted education.82 As a
74. See Turnbull, IDEA. supra note 55, at 449; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415.
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).
76. Id. § 1415(b)(1), (3)-(7).
77. See Turnbull, IDEA, supra note 55, at 449; see also Rowe, supra note 34, at 85.
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1).
79. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
80. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(A).
81. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A).
82. Marcia B. Imbeau, A Century of Gifted Education: A Reflection of Who and What Made a
Difference, GIFTED CHILD TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 40,41. It is generally accepted by scholars in
the field of gifted education that the Russian deployment of Sputnik resulted in two concerns for the
United States: 1) the United States was threatened by our largest communist enemy's advancing
technology; and 2) the United States had been "upstaged" in the space race by the Russian
technology; see also Patricia A. Haensly, My View of the Top 10 Events That Have Influenced the
Field of Gifted Education During the Past Century, GIFTED CHILD TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 33,
35; Mary Ruth Coleman, Back to the Future: The Top 10 Events that Have Shaped Gifted Education
in the Last Century, GIFTED CHILD TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 16, 17; Perry A. Zirkel, The Law
Concerning Public Education of Gifted Students, 34 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 353, 354 (1986)
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result of the Russian space program's advances, the United States Congress
passed the National Defense Education Act of 1958 ("NDEA"), which made
federal funding available to create educational programming for gifted and
talented students.8 3 Thus, during the late 1950s, the government viewed
gifted and talented students as having "the ability to make significant
contributions to the Nation's welfare, especially in the essential areas of
science and technology." 84 Unfortunately for gifted students, the goals of
improving academics for children in order to win the space race gave way to
President Johnson's Great Society programs, and with the passage of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA 65"), the
emphasis on education (and its related federal funding) shifted to identifying
and helping disadvantaged students.8 5 There was a slight return to funding
for gifted education when the ESEA was reauthorized in 1967 ("ESEA
67',).86 Those who lobbied on behalf of gifted students persevered and
eventually succeeded in their efforts to secure greater funding for gifted
education when, in 1970, President Nixon signed The Gifted and Talented
Children's Education Assistance Act of 1969 ("Gifted 69") which allowed
for federal funding for gifted programs under ESEA 70.87
Just as educational scholars cite the launch of Sputnik as one of the most
influential historical events impacting gifted education, scholars universally
credit former Commissioner of Education Sidney Marland with launching
governmental recognition of the educational needs of gifted children.88 In
[hereinafter Zirkel, Law Concerning].
83. Julia Link Roberts, The Top Ten Events Creating Gifted Education for the New Century,
GIFTED CHILD TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1999 at 53, 53. NDEA was intended to emphasize the
development of programming in the sciences, mathematics and foreign languages, and was not
necessarily viewed as benefiting only gifted students. Charles Russo, Education Law and Policy:
Unequal Educational Opportunities for Gifted Students: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul?, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 727, 737 (2001); see also National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72
Stat. 1580 [hereinafter NDEA].
84. Russo, supra note 83, at 737.
85. See id. at 737-38; see also ESEA 65, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27.
86. See Russo, supra note 83, at 738, n.71 (explaining that, although ESEA 67 returned some
funding to gifted programming, out of a total of 1500 education projects funded, only twenty-eight
were for gifted students); see also Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783 (1968) [hereinafter ESEA 67].
87. See Russo, supra note 83, at 738-39; see also Zirkel, Law Concerning, supra note 82, at 355.
Public Law Number 91-230 (1970) was quite important in the area of education. Elementary and
Secondary Education Assistance Programs Extensions, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970)
[hereinafter ESEA 70]. Although it was fundamentally just another amendment to the ESEA, it also
contained section 601, which created the EHA. EHA, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 601, 84 Stat. 121, 175
(1970). It also contained section 806, which permitted funding in the area of gifted and talented
education. Gifted and Talented Education Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 806, 84 Stat. 121, 192
[hereinafter Gifted 69].
88. See Haensly, supra note 82, at 35; Roberts, supra note 83, at 53; Imbeau, supra note 82, at
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submitting his report (known as "The Marland Report") to Congress in
1972, Commissioner Marland created a definition of gifted and talented
which continues to be used by many state and local agencies to this day.89
The Marland Report defined gifted and talented children as:
those identified by professionally qualified persons who by virtue of
outstanding abilities, are capable of high performance. These are
children who require differentiated educational programs and/or
services beyond those normally provided by the regular school
program in order to realize their contribution to self and society.
Children capable of high performance include those with
demonstrated achievement and/or potential ability in any of the
following areas, singly or in combination:
1) general intellectual ability
2) specific academic aptitude
3) creative or productive thinking
4) leadership ability
5) visual and performing arts
6) psychomotor ability. 90
The recommendations of The Marland Report were included in the 1974
Amendments to the ESEA, which generated four major elements for gifted
education legislation: 1) the creation of the Office of Gifted and Talented (a
part of the U.S. Department of Education); 2) the creation of a National
Clearinghouse for the Gifted and Talented; 3) allowances for federal funding
grants in the area of gifted and talented education; and 4) authorization for
an annual federal appropriation for gifted programming, not to exceed $12.5
million [sic]. 91
41; James R. Delisle, A Millennial Hourglass: Gifted Child Education's Sands of Time, GIFTED
CHILD TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 26, 28; Emily D. Stewart, An American Century of Roots and
Signposts in Gifted and Talented Education, GIFTED CHILD TODAY, Nov.-Dec, 1999, at 56, 56.
89. See EDUCATION COMMISSION ON THE STATES, STATE NOTES: STATE GIFTED AND TALENTED
DEFINITIONS (June 2004) [hereinafter ECS], http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/52/28/5228.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2006) (listing state-by-state definitions of gifted and talented qualifications).
90. THE MARLAND REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
91. See Russo, supra note 83, at 739-40. Although this created federal funding in the area of
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The next major development for gifted education came in 1978 with the
passage of the Gifted and Talented Children's Education Act ("Gifted
78").92 In Gifted 78, Congress declared, "the Nation's greatest resource for
solving critical national problems in areas of national concern is its gifted
and talented children." 93 Despite the purposes and objectives created by the
passage of the Act, its existence was brief, for the Act was repealed in 1981,
and along with its repeal came the closing of the Office of Gifted and
Talented and a suspension of federal involvement in gifted education for
quite some time.94
There was renewed legislative support for gifted programs almost
fifteen years later when Congress passed the Jacob K. Javits Gifted and
Talented Students Education Act of 1994 ("Javits 94").95  In Javits 94
Congress stated, "gifted and talented students are a national resource vital to
the future of the Nation and its security and well being. 9 6 Congress further
declared, "unless the special abilities of gifted and talented students are
recognized and developed during such students' elementary and secondary
school years, much of such students' special potential for contributing to the
national interest is likely to be lost., 97 The stated purpose of Javits 94 was
gifted education, proponents felt the $12.5 million [sic] annual budget was woefully short of the $80
million budget requested, as the $12.5 million [sic] represented an annual expenditure of only S 1.00
per gifted child. Id. at 740; see also Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendment of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 404, 88 Stat. 484, 547-49 [hereinafter ESEA 74] (indicating a $12.25 million
grant for fiscal year 1978).
92. See Russo, supra note 83, at 740; see also Gifted and Talented Children's Education Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561 § 901, 92 Stat. 2143, 2292 [hereinafter Gifted 78].
93. Gifted 78, § 901 (a)-(b)(1), 92 Stat. at 2292. The Act further explained that:
[it is the purpose of this part to provide financial assistance to State and local educational
agencies, institutions of higher education, and other public and private agencies and
organizations, to assist such agencies, institutions and organizations to plan, develop,
operate, and improve programs designed to meet the special educational needs of gifted
and talented children.
Id. § 901(c).
94. See Russo, supra note 83, at 740. In 1981, President Reagan introduced the concept of"New
Federalism" which generated the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2175, 95
Stat 357, 809 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (1994)) [hereinafter OBRA]. Id. OBRA
effectuated a 40 percent reduction in funding, as well as eliminating and/or combining several
different grants into a single block grant. Id. Specifically, the Reagan Administration sought to
reduce federal control of education and return that control to the states. See Neal Devins & James B.
Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School Desegregation Cases,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1243, 1254 (1984). The administration argued that the multiple federal
education spending grants and programs then in effect were cumbersome, difficult, and inflexible for
the states, and that it was not the role of the federal government to tell the states how to use the
educational resources granted. Id. at 1255; see also Zirkel, Law Concerning, supra note 82, at 354.
95. See Javits 94, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 10201, 108 Stat. 3519, 3820.
96. Id. § 10202(a)(2).
97. Id. § 10202(a)(4).
virtually the same as the stated purpose of the Gifted and Talented
Children's Act of 1978; namely, to provide funding sources for state and
local educational agencies in the development and implementation of gifted
programming. 98  Javits 94 did, however, add to Gifted 78 in that it gave
"highest priority" to "the identification of and the provision of services to
gifted and talented students who may not be identified and served through
traditional assessment methods (including economically disadvantaged
individuals, individuals of limited-English proficiency, and individuals with
disabilities)." 99
In 2001, education law in the United States underwent a major overhaul
in general with the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB").10o
With the passage of NCLB, Javits 94 was repealed and reauthorized as
Subpart 6 of NCLB ("Javits 01"). 0' As with Javits 94, the purpose was "to
initiate a coordinated program of scientifically based research,
demonstration projects, innovative strategies, and similar activities designed
to build and enhance the ability of elementary schools and secondary schools
nationwide to meet the special educational needs of gifted and talented
students."'' 0 2  The 2001 Javits Act again held that the Secretary shall give
98. Id. § 10202(b). The Act identifies its statement of purpose as:
(1) to provide financial assistance to State and local educational agencies, institutions of
higher education, and other public and private agencies and organizations, to initiate a
coordinated program of research, demonstration projects, personnel training, and similar
activities designed to build a nationwide capability in elementary and secondary schools
to meet the special educational needs of gifted and talented students; (2) to encourage the
development of rich and challenging curricula for all students through the appropriate
application and adaptation of materials and instructional methods developed under this
part; and (3) to supplement and make more effective the expenditure of State and local
funds, for the education of gifted and talented students.
Id.
99. Id. § 10205(a)(1). However, educational scholars felt Javits 94 was deficient in that: 1) its
funding was not large enough to create and support "widespread" programming; 2) because the
grants were voluntary, there was no requirement or mandate to states to create gifted programming;
and 3) unlike the IDEA, there were no procedural or substantative due process safeguards to protect
gifted students. See Russo, supra note 83, at 741.
100. NCLB, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002). NCLB was actually an expansion of a
prior attempt to overhaul the Nation's schools, the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994
[hereinafter IASA] (which, in turn, was an outgrowth of the ESEA). See Ryan, supra note 28, at
937; see also IASA, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994). The ESEA initially created the
concept of Title I schools and Title I funding which was primarily used to create remedial classes for
disadvantaged pupils. Ryan, supra note 28, at 937-38. However, this concept was found to be
ineffective, and subsequently under the IASA, federal funding for education was based on improving
standards and contents for all students and not only disadvantaged students. Id. at 938-39. Like the
IASA, NCLB encourages schools (through the grant of federal funds) to improve their performance
on standardized tests, and the schools, districts and states must improve their performance in specific
tested areas year over year. Id. at 939-940.
101. Jacob K. Javits Gifted and Talented Students Education Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, §
5461, 115 Stat. 1425, 1826 (2002) [hereinafter Javits 01]. Section 5461 of the NCLB states, "[t]his
subpart may be cited as the 'Jacob K. Javits Gifted and Talented Students Education Act of 2001.'
Id.
102. Id. at § 5462. Under Javits 01, funds could be used to: 1) conduct scientific research for
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"highest priority" to developing programs and projects serving students who
may not be identified through "traditional assessment methods."' 03 Javits 01
further expanded on this provision by stating a service priority which held,
"[t]he Secretary shall ensure that not less than 50 percent of the applications
approved under section 5464(a)(2) in a fiscal year address the priority
described in subsection (a)(2)."'1 4
Despite the more than fifty-year history of attempts to increase federal
recognition and federal funding for gifted education, due to today's current
budgetary constraints, we are right back to where we started. Although
Javits 01 currently has provisions for funding in place, as a result of federal
budget cuts, per the current budget for fiscal year 2006, there will not be any
funding grants under Javits 01.105
III. DEFINING THE TWICE EXCEPTIONAL CHILD
A. Who Are They and Where Are They?
"The educational needs of gifted students with disabilities differ
significantly from the needs of most students."' 10 6  Disabled students,
independent of whether their challenges are based in physical, emotional or
identification and teaching methods for gifted students; 2) conduct evaluations, surveys and data
analysis in gifted education; 3) conduct professional development in the field of gifted education; 4)
establish projects and programs for gifted students; 5) develop and establish innovative learning
techniques for gifted students; 6) develop technical programs that could also be adapted for use by
non-gifted students; 7) utilize State regional educational service centers; and 8) develop programs
(such as remote or distance based education) that could be used by students that would not normally
have access to such programming. Id. § 5464(b).
103. Id. § 5465. As with Javits 94, students who "may not be identified and served through
traditional assessment methods" are defined as "economically disadvantaged individuals, individuals
with limited English proficiency, and individuals with disabilities." Id. § 5465(a)(2).
104. Id. § 5465(b).
105. As explained by the Department of Education, "[d]ue to FY 2006 budget constraints, a new
discretionary grant competition will not be held this year for the Jacob K. Javits Gifted and Talented
Students Education Program. Future grant competitions are contingent upon available funding."
There may be hope for the future as the site further instructs potential applicants to "check this site
periodically for updates." U.S. Dep't of Educ. website, http://www.ed.gov/programs/nrdcjavits/
gtenpnrdcjavits.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2006). However, it should be noted that the program was
funded in 2005 as discretionary/competitive grants in the amount of $11,022,122 and cooperative
agreements in the amount of $2,163,248.00 were allocated. U.S. Dep't of Education website,
http://web99.ed.gov/GTEP/Program2.nsf (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
106. L. Dennis Higgins & M. Elizabeth Nielsen, Responding to the Needs of Twice-Exceptional
Learners: A School District and University's Collaborative Approach, in UNIQUELY GIFTED:
IDENTIFYING AND MEETING THE NEEDS OF TWICE-EXCEPTIONAL STUDENTS, 287, 287 (Keisa Kay
ed., 2000).
learning disabilities, are generally accommodated in their schooling by
applications of the provisions of the IDEA.'07 Gifted students, similarly,
have a selection of opportunities ranging from advanced placement classes,
honors classes and enrichment programs. 10 8  However, the gifted yet
disabled child-the twice-exceptional child-is caught in the middle of an
educational battle that he is likely to lose because gifted programming and
special education programming are generally viewed as mutually
exclusive.' 09 This is true partly because of the plethora of misconceptions
surrounding twice-exceptional children, and/or the budgetary constraints
inherent within the school districts."10 According to a 1979 census by the
U.S. Office of Gifted and Talented, approximately 300,000 students were
identified as twice-exceptional, and it is likely that the number is actually
closer to 540,000. 111 Moreover, approximately seven to ten percent of gifted
students have some type of educational handicap, which is approximately
the same ratio of educationally handicapped students in the regular student
population. 112
107. See, e.g., Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 913-14 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that in
order for the district to be in compliance with the provisions of the EAHCA, the school was required
to create an air conditioned classroom for a physically handicapped student); Glendale Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Almasi, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that a physically disabled
child is entitled to physical therapy, occupational therapy and speech and language services in order
to prevent a "loss of educational opportunity.").
108. See Thomas Oakland & Eric Rossen, A 21' Centurv Model for Identifying Students for Gifted
and Talented Programs in Light of National Conditions: An Emphasis on Race and Ethnicity,
GIFTED CHILD TODAY Fall 2005, at 56, 57, 61 (stating an estimated 81% of school districts currently
offer gifted and talented programs, and estimating that "GT programs are most likely to survive,
even flourish, when they help support prevailing broader education efforts, including the promotion
of achievement in light of the NCLBA"). However, unlike special education, there is no federal
legislation that creates an entitlement of gifted education. See PERRY A. ZIRKEL, THE LAW ON
GIFTED EDUCATION, THE NATIONAL RESEARCH CENTER ON THE GIFTED AND TALENTED 4 (2005)
[hereinafter Zirkel, MONOGRAPH]. Additionally, although most states have recognized the need for
gifted education, and as previously identified, most have distinct definitions and requirements for
eligibility for gifted education, very few states have created a state constitutional right to gifted
education. Id.
109. See Frances A. Karnes et al., Gifted Students with Disabilities: Are We Finding Them?,
GIFTED CHILD TODAY, Fall 2004, at 16, 17 (citing multiple state studies in which gifted students
with disabilities were either not identified and/or not served); see also Dawn Beckley, Gifted and
Learning Disabled: Twice Exceptional Students, 1998 Spring Newsl. (Nat'l Research Ctr. For the
Gifted and Talented, Storrs, Conn.), Spring 1998, http://www.gifted.uconn.edu/nrcgt/newletter/
spring98/spmg984.html. Prior to 1981, gifted and learning disabled were viewed as contradictory
terms; however, experts in the field of education gathered at a colloquium held at The Johns Hopkins
University in 1981 to discuss, evaluate and review the twice-exceptional child. See Linda E. Brody
& Carol J. Mills, Gifted Children with Learning Disabilities: A Review of the Issues, 30 J. LEARNING
DISABILITIES 282, 282 (1997).
110. See infra notes 125-138 and accompanying text.
11. See Barbara Clark, Enabling the Gifted-Disabled Learner, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, THE
MAGAZINE, June 2003, at 62. It is likely that the majority of these twice-exceptional students are
gifted and learning disabled. Id.
112. See Stuart Dansinger, Integrating Gifted and Special Education Services in the Schools,
GIFTED CHILD TODAY, May-June 1998, at 38, 38.
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IDEA 04 has defined a child with a disability as a child "(i) with mental
retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language
impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional
disturbance (. . . referred to as 'emotional disturbance'), orthopedic
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or
specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special
education and related services."'1 3  However, because education is
maintained at the state level, each state has its own definition of and criteria
for special education. Some states, such as Oklahoma, simply define
children with disabilities as "children, as defined in the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)."' 14  Some states use the IDEA as a
starting point, and add additional specific disabilities to the IDEA "list."'
' 15
Still other states do not specifically list disorders, and instead define a child
with disabilities broadly, such as Nevada's definition of, "[a] pupil with a
disability' means a person ... who deviates either educationally, physically,
socially or emotionally so markedly from normal patterns that he cannot
progress effectively in a regular school program and therefore needs special
instruction or special services."'1 16  Thus, although the federal government
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A).
114. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 13-101 (2005); see also N.M. STAT, ANN. § 22-13-6 (West 2005); MD.
CODE ANN. EDUC. §8-401(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2004) (identifying a child with a disability as one who
conforms to the IDEA definition).
115. See, e.g., LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:1943(4) (2001 & Supp. 2006) (adding minimal brain
dysfunction, developmental aphasia and dyslexia, brain injury, and perceptual disabilities to the list);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-761(2) (2002 & Supp. 2005) (adding multiple disabilities with severe
sensory impairment, preschool moderate delay, and preschool severe delay to the list from the
IDEA); N.J. STAT. ANN. §18A:46-1 (West 1999) (adding neurologically or perceptually impaired,
chronically ill, socially maladjusted, and pre-school handicapped). Perhaps the most startling
addition is North Carolina's definition, which besides adding epileptic and cerebral palsied children
to the definition of children with disabilities, adds pregnancy as a disability as well. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15C-109 (2003).
116. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.440 (2003). Approximately twenty states have definitions of special
education which do not list specific disabilities. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-20-103(1.5)
(2003) (defining disabilities as "long-term physical impairment or illness; significant limited
intellectual capacity . . . persons . . . whose presence in the ordinary educational program is
detrimental to the education of others."); HW. REV. STAT. § 302A-101 (Supp. 2004) (defining
"exceptional children" as those who "by reason of physical defects cannot attend regular public
school classes with normal children; and ... who are certified by a licensed physician eligible for
membership in the state medical society as being emotionally maladjusted or intellectually incapable
of profiting from ordinary instructional methods."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-24-1(a) (1996) (defining a
child needing special education as any child "who is either mentally retarded or physically or
emotionally handicapped to such an extent that normal educational growth and development are
prevented."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-2-501 (2005) (stating, "[e]very child of school age in the state
of Wyoming having a mental, physical or psychological disability which impairs learning, shall be
entitled to and shall receive a free and appropriate education in accordance with his capabilities.").
Some states, such as Vermont, have such minimalist definitions as to include virtually any health or
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has established a uniform policy for the education of special needs children,
the ability for children to qualify for access to such services is largely
dependent upon which state they live in.
Likewise, the federal government has defined "gifted and talented" as
"students, children, or youth who give evidence of high achievement
capability in areas such as intellectual, creative, artistic, or leadership
capacity, or in specific academic fields, and who need services or activities
not ordinarily provided by the school in order to fully develop those
capabilities."'1 17 Similar to each state's unique definition of a "child with a
disability," individual states also have their own specific definitions of
"gifted. 1 1.. Some states, such as Mississippi have very general definitions
of gifted, stating only, "'[g]ifted children' shall mean children who are found
to have an exceptionally high degree of intellect, and/or academic, creative
or artistic ability." ' 1 9 Conversely, some states, such as North Carolina, have
extremely precise definitions, explaining gifted students as follows:
The General Assembly believes the public schools should challenge
all students to aim for academic excellence and that academically or
intellectually gifted students perform or show the potential to
perform at substantially high levels of accomplishment when
compared with others of their age, experience, or environment.
Academically or intellectually gifted students exhibit high
performance capability in intellectual areas, specific academic
fields, or in both intellectual areas and specific academic fields.
Academically or intellectually gifted students require differentiated
educational services beyond those ordinarily provided by the
regular educational program. Outstanding abilities are present in
learning issue. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2942(1) (2004) (stating that a "'[c]hild with a
disability' means any child in Vermont eligible under state regulations to receive special
education.").
117. NCLB, Pub. L. No. 107-10, § 9101(22), 115 Stat. 1425, 1959 (2002).
118. See Zirkel, MONOGRAPH, supra note 108, at 25; see also ECS, supra note 89. However,
whereas all fifty states have some definition for a disabled child, only forty-six states have
definitions for gifted (Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire and South Dakota do not have a
specific definition of gifted). Id. Additionally, in twenty-five states, the definition was developed
by the state legislature, while in twenty-one states, the definition was developed by the State
Educational Agency. Id.
119. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-23-175 (1973); see also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4 § 52.890
(defining gifted as "exhibiting outstanding intellect, ability, or creative talent."); LA. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 28, § 909 (2006) (defining gifted as "students who demonstrate abilities that give evidence of
high performance in academic and intellectual aptitude."); 22 PA. CODE § 16.1 (2006) (stating,
"[m]entally gifted - [o]utstanding intellectual and creative ability the development of which requires
specially designed programs or support services, or both, not ordinarily provided in the regular
education program.").
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students from all cultural groups, across all economic strata, and in
all areas of human endeavor. 
20
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-150.5 (2003); see also 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-40-20 (2006);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, § 3822 (2005) (showing examples of very precise definitions of gifted);
The Virginia Code defines gifted students as follows:
[T[hose students in public elementary and secondary schools beginning with kindergarten
through graduation whose abilities and potential for accomplishment are so outstanding
that they require special programs to meet their educational needs. These students will be
identified by professionally qualified persons through the use of multiple criteria as
having potential or demonstrated abilities and who have evidence of high performance
capabilities, which may include leadership, in one or more of the following areas:
1. Intellectual aptitude or aptitudes. Students with advanced aptitude or
conceptualization whose development is accelerated beyond their age peers as
demonstrated by advanced skills, concepts and creative expression in multiple
general intellectual ability or in specific intellectual abilities.
2. Specific academic aptitude. Students with specific aptitudes in selected academic
areas: mathematics; the sciences; or the humanities as demonstrated by advanced
skills, concepts, and creative expression in those areas.
3. Technical and practical arts aptitude. Students with specific aptitudes in selected
technical or practical arts as demonstrated by advanced skills and creative
expression in those areas to the extent they need and can benefit from specifically
planned educational services differentiated from those provided by the general
program experience.
4. Visual or performing arts aptitude. Students with specific aptitudes in selected
visual or performing arts as demonstrated by advanced skills and creative
expression who excel consistently in the development of a product or performance
in any of the visual and performing arts to the extent that they need and can benefit
from specifically planned educational services differentiated from those generally
provided by the general program experience.
8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-40-20. The California Code defines gifted programming and
identification policies as:
Each district shall use one or more of these categories in identifying pupils as gifted and
talented. In all categories, identification of a pupil's extraordinary capability shall be in
relation to the pupil's chronological peers.
(a) Intellectual Ability: A pupil demonstrates extraordinary or potential for
extraordinary intellectual development.
(b) Creative Ability: A pupil characteristically:
(1) Perceives unusual relationships among aspects of the pupil's environment
and among ideas;
(2) Overcomes obstacles to thinking and doing;
(3) Produces unique solutions to problems.
(c) Specific Academic Ability: A pupil functions at highly advanced economic
levels in particular subject areas.
(d) Leadership Ability: A pupil displays the characteristic behaviors necessary for
extraordinary leadership.
(e) High Achievement: A pupil consistently produces advanced ideas and products
and/or attains exceptionally high scores on achievement tests.
(f) Visual and Performing Arts Talent: A pupil originates, performs, produces, or
responds at extraordinarily high levels in the arts.
(g) Any other category which meets the standards set forth in these regulations.
Moreover, some states, such as Delaware and Oregon simply use the
original definition for gifted created by the Marland Report in 1972.121
Thus, access and eligibility to gifted education and programming is, like
special education, different depending on the state of residence of the
child. 122
The twice-exceptional student, on the other hand, is the student who has
the unique circumstance of meeting the definitions of both "child with a
disability" and "gifted."' 123 The National Research Center for the Gifted and
Talented ("NRC/GT") has identified three distinct subgroups of gifted and
learning disabled students: 1) the "identified gifted underachiever" is the
identified gifted student who routinely underperforms in school as related to
his intellect and is generally not suspected of having learning challenges; 2)
the "identified special education student" is the student who has been
identified as needing special education services, but whose innate intellect
has been overlooked or masked because of the disability; and 3) the
"overlooked general education student" is likely the largest of the three
groups, and is the student who is placed in a general education classroom,
and is perceived to be a normal child with neither gifted nor special
education needs because the two different exceptionalities counteract each
other. 124
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, § 3822
121. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3101(3) (1993) which defines gifted as such:
"Gifted or talented person" means a person in the chronological age group 4 through 20
years inclusive, who by virtue of certain outstanding abilities is capable of high
performance in an identified field. Such an individual, identified by professionally
qualified persons, may require differentiated educational programs or services beyond
those normally provided by the regular school program in order to realize his or her full
contribution to self and society. A person capable of high performance as herein defined
includes one with demonstrated achievement and/or potential ability in any of the
following areas, singularly or in combination:
a. General intellectual ability;
b. Specific academic aptitude;
c. Creative or productive thinking;
d. Leadership ability;
e. Visual and performing arts ability;
f. Psychomotor ability;
and OR. REV. STAT. § 343.395 (2003); see also MARLAND REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
122. See generally Zirkel, MONOGRAPH, supra note 108 for an excellent analysis of state-by-state
application of state legislation and regulations for gifted education.
123. See Clark, supra note 111 at 62. The gifted disabled child is known by several different
terms. See, e.g., Zirkel, MONOGRAPH, supra note 108, at 15 (referring to gifted and disabled student
as "gifted plus"); SUSAN BAUM, ET AL., To BE GIFTED AND LEARNING DISABLED 2 (1991)
(referring to gifted and disabled children as "GLD"); and Colleen Willard-Holt, Dual
Exceptionalities, THE ERIC CLEARINGHOUSE ON DISABILITIES AND GIFTED EDUCATION, ERIC EC
DIGEST E574 (1999), http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERCDocs/data/ericdocs2/content-storage_01/000000
0b/80/2a/2d/aa.pdf (referring to the gifted and disabled child as one with "dual exceptionalities").
124. See Beckley, supra note 109. The "gifted underachievers" underachievement is oftentimes
attributed to low self-esteem, lack of appropriate motivation, and laziness. See Brody & Mills, supra
note 109, at 282. This student may make it all the way through the educational system and never be
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The twice-exceptional student as described in group three is frequently
overlooked and/or misdiagnosed for one or both of their exceptionalities
because the child's intelligence often masks the learning disability; and
conversely, the disability can frequently mask the child's giftedness. 125  For
example, a child with an IQ of 140 (identified at the 99th percentile) who
was reading at grade level would be performing at the 50th percentile.1
2 6
Because he would be performing at an acceptable level for the regular
classroom, he would not be suspected as a child in need of special education
services, nor would he be a child identified as "gifted."' 127  Thus, although
the child could, and should be able to perform at a level commensurate with
his intellectual abilities (i.e. substantially above grade-level), because of his
disabilities, his performance is far below this expectation. 121 If, on the other
hand, the child is identified as gifted (as a result of some other performance
test), because of his grade-level performance, he is likely to be labeled as
either "lazy" and/or "underachieving."' 129  This misdiagnosis causes gifted
children to fall far short of their true potential. 
30
identified as disabled, with the giftedness continuing to mask the disability. Id. As assessment and
evaluation pertains to the second group of students, it has been estimated that as many as one-third
of the special education students actually have superior intelligence. Id. at 283. However, like their
identified gifted counterparts, these students may never be revealed as twice-exceptional because
their disability masks their intellect. Id. In the case of the third group of students, this child too may
complete their entire academic experience while thought of as an "average" student, never realizing
their giftedness or their need for special education services. Id. Thus, this student is likely to finish
school never realizing their true academic potential. Id.
125. See Clark, supra note 111, at 63.
126. Steven G. Zecker, Underachievement and Learning Disabilities in Children Who are Gifted,
http://www.ctd.northwestem.edu/resources/socemoachieve/underachieveld.html.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Lisa Fine, Diamonds in the Rough, EDUCATION WEEK, Oct. 24, 2001 at 38, 39; see also
Willard-Holt, supra note 123. Willard-Holt describes a variety of challenges involved in assessing
the gifted disabled child, such as: 1) hearing impaired children would not effectively respond to oral
test directions and/or have a reduced vocabulary that is not commensurate with their intelligence; 2)
children with speech and language delays do not adequately respond to tests that require a verbal
response; 3) visually impaired children may not adequately respond to testing criterion that is
dependent on understanding of visual concepts (such as color); 4) physically handicapped children
may have reduced scores as a result of a limited exposure to certain life experiences; and 5) twice-
exceptional children may have elevated comprehension but poor reading skills, or elevated critical
thinking but poor expressive skills, resulting in a skewed and incorrect testing result. Id.
Accordingly, in order to properly identify gifted students in the physically disabled population,
modifications should be made in the testing, evaluation and identification processes. See Clark,
supra note 111, at 65.
130. See Laura Ketterman, Does the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Exclude Gifted
and Talented Children with Emotional Disabilities? An Analysis of J.D. v Pawlet, 32 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 913, 919 (2001).
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Physical disabilities, such as blindness, deafness, or orthopedic
impairments are also disabilities which would result in the necessity for the
child to receive special education services. 131  However, although these
children are physically disabled, they are very likely to be academically
normal, if not gifted. 1
32
IDEA 04, along with many states, also recognizes an emotional
disturbance under the definition of "child with a disability."' 133  Students
exhibiting emotional disturbances experience "frustration, boredom,
alienation, apathy, and hopelessness," in addition to acting out with "passive
resistance as well as aggressive behavior at school." 1
3 4
Perhaps the largest challenge faced by the twice-exceptional child is the
child's own perception of his failings. Twice-exceptional children
frequently suffer from frustration and low self-esteem which in turn leads to
poor classroom performance and behavioral problems.' Undiagnosed
and/or underserved twice-exceptional children can become aggressive,
defensive, careless and can oftentimes cause disruptions in the classroom. 1
3 6
Ultimately, the gifted yet disabled child who is not intellectually stimulated
will not only fail to reach their full academic potential, but, quite possibly
will regress and develop such characteristics as learned helplessness 137 and
lack of motivation. 138 Thus, it behooves the child, the school and society to
131. See IDEA 04, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A).
132. See Kielbus v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 140 F. Supp. 2d 284, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving
a gifted child who is hard of hearing). Furthermore, the physically disabled child population (unless
the disability is one that results in a mental or cognitive deficiency) is generally likely to have the
same percentage of gifted students as one would find in the non-disabled population. See Clark,
supra note I l, at 65.
133. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i). Many states also include emotional disturbances in their
definition of disabled. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-39-2(1) (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.350(2)
(2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-761(2) (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-41-302(2) (1997-1999); CAL
EDUC. CODE § 8208(L) (WEST 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76A(5) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-
2-152(A) (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-2001(3) (2001); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 226.75 (1998);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-962(z) (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.20(1) (1996); MD. CODE ANN.
EDUC.§ 8-401(A)(2) (2004); MINN. STAT. § 125A.02 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-C:2
(1999); N.J. STAT ANN. § 18A:46-1 (West 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109 (2003); N.D. CENT
CODE § 15.1-32-01 (2003); ORE. REV. STAT § 343.035(1) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-10-102
(2002); TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 29.003(B) (Vernon 1996); UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
SPECIAL EDUCATION RULES, I.E. (52) (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-213 (2003); WIs. STAT. §
115.76(5) (2004).
134. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Adam J. v. Keller Indep.
Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 2003) (involving a "bright young man who suffer[ed] from
serious behavioral problems," which ultimately resulted in his placement at a private residential
treatment facility.).
135. See Beckley, supra note 109.
136. Id.
137. "Learned helplessness" is a term used to indicate the situation that results when the
underlying problem is not properly addressed and the child feels "that they have no control over their
lives and that it is not in their power to master the tasks before them." LAWRENCE E. SHAPIRO,
PH.D., AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION 89 (2001).
138. See Clark, supra note 11l, at 62, 64. Twice-exceptional children exhibit a wide array of
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address the twice-exceptional child's unique educational needs so as to
avoid these social and behavioral issues.
Although the Supreme Court had previously held that education was not
a "fundamental right,"'39 the Court, nonetheless held in Plyler v. Doe that
"education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our
society."' 140 "We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our
Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and
skills upon which our social order rests."' 41  In affirming the value of
education to all, Justice Brennan noted that "[lack of education] imposes a
lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their
disabling status."' 142 Plyler came twenty-eight years after Brown v. Board of
Education, and essentially reiterated the Court's holding in Brown that
education is "perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." 141
On the heels of the Plyler decision, the Supreme Court came out with a
vastly different holding in Board of Education v. Rowley.'44 Amy Rowley
was a deaf kindergarten student who, aside from her deafness, performed
behaviors, such as, "lack of social skills, social isolation, unrealistic self-expectations, perfectionist
tendencies, distractibility, frustration in response to school demands, low self-esteem, and failure to
complete assignments." Id. at 64.
139. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
140. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). Plyler dealt with a challenge to a Texas Statute (§
21.031) that denied children of illegal aliens access to public education. Id. at 205. In a five-four
decision, the Court held, "[i]f the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free
public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be
justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. No such showing was made
here." Id. at 230.
141. Id. at 221. Justice Brennan also commented, "[t]he American people have always regarded
education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance." Id. (citing Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)).
142. Id. at 223.
143. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
144. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Plyler was argued before the Court on
December 1, 1981, and decided on June 15, 1982. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202. The Court split five-four
in Plyler, with Justice Brennan writing for the majority, and joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell and Stevens. Id. at 203. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor, filed a dissenting opinion. Id. Rowley, on the other hand, was argued on March 23, 1982
and was decided on June 28, 1982, a mere two weeks after the Plyler decision was issued. Rowley,
458 U.S. at 179. In what amounted to a game ofjudicial musical chairs, the Justices rearranged their
positions. The Court split six-three with the opinion written by Justice Rehnquist and joined by
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Id. Justice Blackmun filed a
concurring opinion. Id. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, wrote a dissenting
opinion. Id. Of particular note is the fact that the Rowley decision did not mention the Plyler
decision at all, leaving the reader to wonder why the opinions are so different from each other. See
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
well in school. 145  Although Amy was an "excellent lipreader" [sic],
performed "better than the average child," and had established an
"extraordinary rapport" with both teachers and students, the district court
found that as a result of Amy's hearing deficit, Amy "'understands
considerably less of what goes on in class than she could if she were not
deaf' and thus 'is not learning as much, or performing as well academically,
as she would without her handicap."" 146 When the school district refused
Amy's parents' request that the district provide a sign language interpreter
for Amy, the Rowleys challenged Amy's IEP.147 The Rowleys' contention
was that, because Amy was not being given an opportunity to perform to her
full potential, she was not being granted FAPE under the EAHCA. 48  The
Supreme Court however disagreed and reversed, holding that the legislative
intent of the EAHCA was only to provide handicapped students with the
"'basic floor of opportunity"' that "should be reasonably calculated to
enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to
grade." 149
B. Chevys v. Cadillacs
Rowley has since become the standard for establishing FAPE under the
IDEA. 150 Courts routinely evaluate the child's IEP and placement as
necessary only to provide the Rowley "floor of opportunity."'' In John Doe
v. Board of Education of Tullahoma City Schools, the Sixth Circuit stated
that even though Rowley created the "floor for education of the handicapped
... [and] states may impose a higher standard if they choose.., we do not
find such a holding to be justified in this case.' 52 The court further clarified
their holding with the following colorful analogy:
145. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.
146. Id. at 184-85 (citing Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
147. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184-85.
148. Id. at 186. The District Court agreed with the Rowleys, defining FAPE as "an opportunity to
achieve her full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children," and further
stating "[FAPE] requires that the potential of the handicapped child be measured and compared to
his or her performance, and that the resulting differential or 'shortfall' be compared to the shortfall
experienced by non-handicapped children." Id. (citing Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 534). Additionally,
although divided, the United States Circuit Court for the Second Circuit affirmed. Id. (citing Rowley
v. Bd. of Educ., 632 F.2d 945,947 (2d Cir. 1980)).
149. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201, 204.
150. Judith DeBerry, Comment, When Parents and Educators Clash: Are Special Education
Students Entitled to a Cadillac Education?, 34 ST. MARY'S L. J. 503, 523 (2003).
151. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201; see also A.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315, 325 (4th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the district court "correctly recognized that [the district] offered A.B. an IEP that was
reasonably calculated to provide him some educational benefit, thus providing a FAPE and
satisfying IDEA's modest requirement.").
152. Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Tullahoma City Sch., 9 F.3d 455, 457-58 (6th Cir. 1993). Student
John Doe was evaluated for learning issues and was found to have an IQ of 130, as well as a
"neurological impairment that hinders his ability to process auditory information and engage in
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The Act requires that the Tullahoma schools provide the educational
equivalent of a serviceable Chevrolet to every handicapped student.
Appellant, however, demands that the Tullahoma school system
provide a Cadillac solely for appellant's use. We suspect that the
Chevrolet offered to appellant is in fact a much nicer model than
that offered to the average Tullahoma student. Be that as it may, we
hold that the Board is not required to provide a Cadillac, and that
the proposed IEP is reasonably calculated to provide educational
benefits to appellant, and is therefore in compliance with the
requirements of the IDEA. '53
Part of the problem with creating the twice-exceptional child's IEP is
the difficulty satisfying the IDEA's "least restrictive environment" ("LRE")
concern.15 4 LRE dictates that disabled children should, whenever possible,
be educated with non-disabled children; however twice-exceptional children
would likely benefit more from, "a class for students with dual
exceptionalities [which] would allow the kind of ongoing support such
children need."' 155  Thus, the twice-exceptional child will likely perform
better in a segregated environment, which is an environment completely at
odds with the LRE goal of the IDEA.
IV. GETTING THE TWICE EXCEPTIONAL CHILD THE CADILLAC HE DESERVES
"Teachers wouldn't want to overlook the next Albert Einstein or
Thomas Edison, for instance. Both had trouble in school, but, as history and
normal language and thinking skills," which entitled him to services for special education. Id. at
456. Although the school district convened to create an IEP for the student, the parents chose to
enroll their child in a private school prior to the completion of the IEP, claiming that the private
school was the "only appropriate placement." Id. Alleging that the private school was the only way
for the student to receive FAPE, the parents sued the district for funding for the private school. Id. at
456-57. After analyzing the "least restrictive environment" element of the public school versus the
private school, the court concluded that even though the private school was "certainly an
appropriate, and in some respects even a superior, placement, it is clearly far more restrictive than
the IEP proposed by the [school district]." Id. at 460.
153. Tullahoma, 9 F.3d at 459-60. Not only have courts routinely followed Rowley, but several
courts have adopted the Tullahoma court's Chevrolet-Cadillac analogy as well. See, e.g., Troy Sch.
Dist. v. Boutsikaris, 250 F. Supp. 2d 720, 735 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Nein v. Greater Clark County Sch.
Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 961, 977 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Logue v. Shawnee Mission Pub. Sch. Unified Sch.
Dist., No. 512, 959 F. Supp. 1338, 1351 (D. Kan. 1997); Hudson v. Bloomfield Hills Pub. Sch., 910
F. Supp. 1291, 1305 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
154. See Clark, supra note 11l, at 65; see also Tullahoma, 9 F.3d at 460 (commenting that the IEP
that was developed for the student represented a "less restrictive alternative" and thus satisfied the
Act's LRE requirement).
155. Clark, supra note 111, at 65; see also supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text; IDEA 04,
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(A).
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two lifetimes of towering scientific achievement demonstrated, they fit
comfortably within any definition of 'gifted."" 56 Additionally, as Secretary
of Education Marland commented, "Helen Keller was a member of several
minorities, yet unquestionably gifted."'57  Hence, history has shown that
"disabled" does not necessarily translate into unintelligent or
unsuccessful. 158
But, when children are given low expectations for their academic
success, they will likely sink to the lowest common denominator and return
exactly what is expected of them; put simply, low expectations garner low
results. 159  Overcoming low expectations in educational performance is a
fundamental goal of IDEA 04.16° Similarly, the Marland Report explained
156. Fine, supra note 129, at 39.
157. THE MARLAND REPORT, supra note 5, at 93. History is replete with brilliant authors,
scientists, politicians and statesmen who were known (or, depending on their time in history,
retroactively believed to be) learning disabled. See Hurford, supra note 8, at 20-25. Just a brief
sampling of twice-exceptional historical figures would include: 1) Leonardo da Vinci (although he
could solve any scientific or artistic problem, he had trouble with both reading and writing and he
always wrote in "mirror writing," which was backwards from normal writing); 2) Winston Churchill
(Churchill commented, "I was on the whole considerably discouraged by my school days. Except in
Fencing, in which I had won the Public School Championship, I had achieved no distinction."); 3)
Hans Christian Anderson, who was reported to be dyslexic; 4) Investment broker Charles Schwab,
who though he may not yet be a historical figure, is certainly considered an example of a 20th
century successful and highly intelligent person who, as an "unidentified dyslexic.., went through
Stanford University reading at ... half the speed of other students;" and 5) Nelson Rockefeller, who
is cited as "the first famous dyslexic to 'go public' with his difficulties." Id. at 20-21, 25.
158. Although these examples of twice-exceptional students succeeded despite their adversities,
they are in a select group that was able to do so. It seems undisputed that these individuals had
enormous intellect which certainly contributed to their ability to compensate for their deficits. The
brighter the child, the more likely they are to come up with their own compensating techniques.
Unfortunately for the vast majority of twice-exceptional students, the ability to self-compensate is
also detrimental in that it is not generally sufficient and it serves to mask the underlying problem
afflicting the child. See generally, Linda K. Silverman, Ph.D., The Two-Edged Sword of
Compensation: How the Gifted Cope with Learning Disabilities, in UNIQUELY GIFTED: IDENTIFYING
AND MEETING THE NEEDS OF TWICE-EXCEPTIONAL STUDENTS, 153, 153-65 (Keisa Kay ed., 2000)
(defining and explaining how gifted disabled children compensate, and how it both helps and hinders
their educational performance).
159. See Hugh O'Donnell, What's Wrong With the Picture: The Other Side of Representing
Parents in Child Protection Cases, 4 APPALACHIAN J.L. 73, 84 (2005).
160. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3)-(5). The Act states that:
(3) Since the enactment and implementation of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, this chapter has been successful in ensuring children with
disabilities and the families of such children access to a free appropriate public education
and in improving educational results for children with disabilities.
(4) However, the implementation of this chapter has been impeded by low expectations,
and an insufficient focus on applying replicable research on proven methods of teaching
and learning for children with disabilities.
(5) Almost 30 years of research and experience has demonstrated that the education of
children with disabilities can be made more effective by--
(A) having high expectations for such children and ensuring their access to the
general education curriculum in the regular classroom, to the maximum extent
possible, in order to--
(i) meet developmental goals and, to the maximum extent possible, the
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that when gifted children are properly stimulated and challenged, they
succeeded; yet when they are not sufficiently challenged, they "performed
far below their capacity, [and] . . . found their educational experiences
frustrating.' 61  Thus, it would seem that the goals of both special education
and gifted education are similar in their objective to improve both the
academic and social development and success of the child by raising the
expectations of performance. Accordingly, it would seem that it is in the
best interest of the twice-exceptional child to partake in services from both
programs. 162 Given the nearly identical goals of the two acts, and the fact
that Javits 01 specifically calls for inclusion of special education children in
its programming, it is most unfortunate that courts routinely find that the
Rowley "floor" is all that is necessary when faced with a twice-exceptional
student. '63
A. Impact Significance
Plaintiff John Doe, Jr. was so "emotionally deteriorated" that his parents
felt the need to hospitalize him for five months during his sixth-grade
year. 164 Moreover, he was described as "depressed and violent" and John's
psychiatrist testified that John "felt very pressured and could be aggressive
and destructive to other children." 165  Yet, the court held, "[d]espite the
evidence of the plaintiffs behavioral difficulties . . . he was not a
handicapped child entitled to special education."' 166 The sole reason? "The
challenging expectations that have been established for all children; and
(ii) be prepared to lead productive and independent adult lives, to the
maximum extent possible.
161. THE MARLAND REPORT, supra note 5, at 88. Secretary Marland went on to explain that
"[t]he highly gifted received little understanding and emotional support from school and
community." Id. Yet, when the students were properly challenged and given a chance to "satisfy
their desires for knowledge and performance, their own sense of adequacy and well-being
improve[d]." Id.
162. Although educational scholars have recommended that twice-exceptional students be offered
services simultaneously, with the current legal interpretation, it is likely that the twice-exceptional
student will receive services in "one or the other area, but not both." See Brody & Mills, supra note
109, at 284.
163. See Javits 01, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 5465, 115 Stat. 1425, 1828; see also Bd. of Educ. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 1993)
(commenting that the Act "provides no more than a basic floor of opportunity") (quoting Rowley,
458 U.S. at 201); A.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (asserting that "IDEA's FAPE
standards are far more modest than to require that a child excel or thrive.").
164. John Doe, Jr. v. Bd. of Educ., 753 F. Supp. 65, 66 (D. Conn.. 1990).
165. Id. at 66, 70.
166. Id. at 70.
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plaintiffs academic performance . . . before, during, and after his
hospitalization [was] satisfactory or above."'' 67
As this case shows, the court's application of the IDEA in cases of a
twice-exceptional child frequently defeats the goal of raising expectations in
educating the child. The conflict can be summarized as a "contradiction
between the floor-like standard of appropriateness under the IDEA and the
ceiling-like needs of gifted students."
168
Hence, parents of twice-exceptional children wishing to challenge their
school districts to address their child's unique needs could attempt two
different approaches (although, as this comment will show, one approach
has a much greater chance of success).16 9 The first argument that parents
can attempt would be one based in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.170  The second,
and arguably stronger argument, is based on the statutory law of Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.171
B. Equal Protection Approach
Perhaps Chief Justice Warren stated this argument best when he posited
in dicta, "[educational] opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
172
One could logically argue that the educational opportunity of a gifted
education, if offered to one student, should be offered to all eligible students.
Conversely, if a special education opportunity were to be offered to one
student, that opportunity also should be offered to all eligible students.
Thus, one could argue, that as long as a state offers both of these types of
educational services, the twice-exceptional child has an equal protection
right to both.
Let us assume that the parents of Albert Einstein (one of history's most
celebrated twice-exceptional students) brought an equal protection action to
167. Id. The court further clarified that "[i]n order to qualify as a seriously emotionally disturbed
child, the condition must exist over a long period of time and must 'adversely affect[] educational
performance."' Id. at 70 n.9 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(8)); see also Jan C. Costello, "The
Trouble is They're Growing, The Trouble is They're Grown ": Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Adolescents' Participation in Mental Health Care Decisions, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 607, 612 (2003)
(depicting a hypothetical twice-exceptional child and resulting at risk scenarios).
168. See Zirkel, MONOGRAPH, supra note 108, at 16. Professor Zirkel identifies the primary
problem as the court's inability to recognize the concept of twice-exceptional children (primarily due
to the element of the two exceptionalities masking each other). Id.
169. See infra Part IV.B-C.
170. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (stating "[n]o state shall ... deny ... any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see also infra Part IV.B.
171. See RA504, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973); see also infra Part IV.C.
172. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Allen W. Hubsch, Education and
Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 102
(1989) (commenting on the prevalence of education litigation in the federal courts).
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satisfy Albert's educational needs (assuming, arguendo, that the Einsteins
lived in present day United States during Albert's youth).
The first hurdle Mr. and Mrs. Einstein need to get over is the "right to
education." However, as has been previously noted, there is no fundamental
right to education. 73  Forging ahead, the Einsteins can argue that the
Supreme Court found an equal protection right to education in Brown v.
Board of Education.'74  Brown, however, is based on race, which is a
suspect class and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.175 However, since
disability rather than race is the issue for Albert, he is unlikely to prevail
under the same terms as Brown.
While Brown is the preeminent case for equal protection in the field of
education, it is by no means alone. Equal protection in education was also
argued before the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez. 176 In assessing the level of scrutiny applicable to the
Rodriguez case, Justice Powell held, "we find neither the suspect-
classification nor the fundamental-interest analysis persuasive.' 1 77  The
Court commented that the holding did not "detract[] from [the Court's]
historic dedication to public education[;]" but rather, the Court held
education was not "fundamental for purposes of examination under the
Equal Protection Clause."'178  Having determined that education was not
subject to strict scrutiny evaluation, the Court held, "the answer lies in
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution ... [e]ducation ... is not among the rights
173. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
174. See Brown, 347 U.S at 495. Chief Justice Warren held, "[w]e conclude that in the field of
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal .. . we hold that the plaintiffs [are] ... deprived of the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
175. See Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 525, 529. Strict scrutiny review, the highest level of
constitutional review, requires the government to prove that the government action requested is the
"least restrictive or least discriminatory alternative." Id. at 416. Litigation addressing Equal
Protection that is analyzed under strict scrutiny review is usually found to be unconstitutional
because: 1) the Government has the burden of proof, and 2) the government must show that the law
is "necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose." Id.
176. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Rodriguez involved a class action suit by citizens residing in poorer
communities in Texas. Id. at 4-5. The plaintiffs contended that the Texas educational funding
scheme discriminated against poorer communities and subsequently brought an action under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 5-6.
177. Id. at 18. Justice Powell expounded further, "[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the
class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection." Id. at 28.
178. Id. at 30.
afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find
any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected."' 7 9
Having determined that education is not a fundamental right and is not
subject to strict scrutiny review, the Einsteins must now make an equal
protection argument using a lower level of scrutiny, such as rational basis
review. 180 Additionally, since cases involving disabilities are judged under a
rational basis review (as disability is not considered a suspect class),
Albert's disability does not affect the level of scrutiny used for the Einstein's
case. 181
Accordingly, in response to the Einstein's contention that Albert is
being denied an equal opportunity to both gifted education services and
special education services, the State would only need to show that its basis
for denying Albert access to both forms of educational services satisfies any
conceivable legitimate governmental purpose. 182  The government will most
likely contend that the expenses involved in finding, identifying, and
servicing the twice-exceptional child are cost prohibitive. 183 Unfortunately
for the Einsteins, case law has shown that budgetary constraints are
sufficient grounds to find a statute or law constitutional under the rational
basis test.184 For that reason, the Einsteins are unlikely to prevail under this
179. Id. at 33-35. Justice Powell further explained the holding, commenting, "[a]s we have said,
the undisputed importance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual
standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation." Id. at 35.
180. The Supreme Court has held, "[u]nless a classification involves suspect classes or
fundamental rights, judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause demands only a conceivable
rational basis for the challenged state distinction." Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 27 (1992).
Rational basis review is the lowest level of review for constitutional litigation involving equal
protection. See Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 414-415. In order for the law to survive a
constitutional challenge, the government must show the law is "rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose." Id. at 415. Additionally, the disputed legislation need only show "any
conceivable legitimate purpose." Id.
181. See Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 631 (explaining that the "Supreme Court... has ruled
that only rational basis review should be used for discrimination based on disability."). However,
Professor Chemerinsky did point out that, although the rational basis level of review creates a
difficult test for an equal protection claim to overcome, the disabled plaintiffs in City of Cleburne,
Texas v. Cleburne Living Centers, Inc. did just that when the Court found a "city ordinance that
required a special permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally disabled" to be both
discriminatory and unconstitutional. Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctrs., 473 U.S.
432 (1985)).
182. See Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 415.
183. See Davalene Cooper, The Death of Common Sense: How Law is Suffocating America, 29
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 669, 674 (1995) (reviewing PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON
SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994)).
184. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 237-38 (1981) (In determining the
constitutionality of reducing Medicaid funds to a certain class of individuals, the Court held,
"Medicaid funds [are] 'rationally related to the legitimate legislative desire to avoid spending federal
resources on behalf of individuals whose care and treatment are being fully provided for by state and
local government units;" and that "Congress rationally may elect to shoulder only part of the burden
of supplying this allowance."); Ackerman v. Columbus, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1360-61 (M.D. Ga.
2003) (holding that budgetary restraints which limit the City's ability to grant raises to a certain class
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argument. 185  As a final word of advice regarding a potential equal
protection claim, the Einsteins would be wise to heed the cautionary words
of Allen Hubsch, who explained that:
Significantly, success upon an equal protection claim, whether
based on suspect class categorization, fundamental right, or rational
basis contains a further limitation. The equal protection clause does
not impose an affirmative duty upon any state to provide its students
with an assured quality education. The equal protection clause only
requires that states, once they determine the quality of education to
provide, offer that level of quality equally to all children. In
response to an equal protection challenge, the state might
theoretically lower the quality of education or the level of
expenditure in all its school districts to that provided in the school
district attended by the suspect class. 1
86
C. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504 Approach
Before commencing an argument based on Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Einsteins must first exhaust all
administrative remedies available to them under the IDEA. 187  Once the
of city employees have a rational basis and "do not result in an unconstitutional denial of Plaintiffs'
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution"); Little v. Terhune, 200 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452 (D.N.J. 2002) (holding that "the
disparate availability of educational programming between inmates in the general population at
NJSP and inmates in administrative segregation at [New Jersey State Prison] is rationally related to
overlapping security concerns and budgetary constraints").
185. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 26 ("[Nlot every denial of a right conferred by state law involves
a denial of the equal protection of the laws, even though the denial of the right to one person may
operate to confer it on another." (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944))).
186. See Hubsch, supra note 172, at 106.
187. See Zirkel, MONOGRAPH, supra note 108, at 20 (stating that in order to bring a claim under
Section 504, plaintiffs must first exhaust the due process rights afforded them under the IDEA).
Further, the IDEA provides:.
(A) In general. Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection
(f) or (k) who does not have the right to an appeal under subsection (g) of this section,
and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under this subsection, shall
have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to
this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or
in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.
(B) Limitation. The party bringing the action shall have 90 days from the date of the
decision of the hearing officer to bring such an action, or, if the State has an explicit time
limitation for bringing such action under this subchapter, in such time as the State law
allows.
(C) Additional requirements. In any action brought under this paragraph, the court
(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings;
(ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and
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Einsteins have done so, they can bring a claim alleging that Albert is a
victim of discrimination under Section 504.188 Specifically, Section 504
states, "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States,
as defined in section 7(6), 189 shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."' 90 Thus, the Einsteins' argument would be that since Albert is
"otherwise qualified" as gifted, he cannot be denied the benefits of a gifted
education on the basis of his disability. Likewise, since Albert is "otherwise
qualified" as disabled, he cannot be denied the benefits of special education
on the basis of his giftedness.
In order for the Einsteins to bring a claim under Section 504, Albert
must meet the three-pronged eligibility requirement: 1) "physical or mental
impairment," 2) "major life activity," and 3) "substantial limitation."'191 A
glance at Albert's childhood reveals that he would most likely meet the
qualifications of Section 504: 1) he did not speak until age three, 2) he had
difficulty with memorization, 3) he would frequently sit alone and do
nothing for long periods of time, and 4) he "couldn't learn by rote, and
ignored whatever bored him."'192 Thus, it is likely that he will be eligible for
accommodations under Section 504. Students who qualify for services
under Section 504 may potentially receive district funding for specialized
(iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief
as the court determines is appropriate.
IDEA 04, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).
188. See RA504, Pub. L. No. 93-112 § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973). The Rehabilitation Act of
1973 is a federal civil rights act designed to protect the civil rights of the disabled. See Todd A.
Mitchell, Employment, the Law, and the Community College: A Primer, 192 WEST EDUC. L. REP.
613, 626 (2004). Section 504 of the Act is a civil rights statute that is monitored by the United
States Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights [hereinafter OCR]. Id.
189. Section 7(6) of RA504 provides:
The term 'handicapped individual' means any individual who (A) has a physical or
mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap
to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability
from vocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to titles I and III of this act."
190. RA504 § 504; see also Ketterman, supra note 130, at 920-21 (explaining that public schools
are subject to the provisions of the Act).
191. See Perry A. Zirkel, Conducting Legally Defensible § 504/ADA Eligibility Determinations,
176 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 1, 2 (2003) [hereinafter Zirkel, Defensible]. "The pertinent statutory
definition, which is identical in Sec. 504 and the ADA, is 'physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more .. , major life activities." Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)). Per
the OCR, this definition shall be used to determine eligibility for FAPE, "which is the entitlement
under § 504." Zirkel, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 36, at 33.
192. Keisa Kay, Albert Einstein's Brain: Atypical Anatomy and Implications for Twice
Exceptionality, in UNIQUELY GIFTED: IDENTIFYING AND MEETING THE NEEDS OF TWICE-
EXCEPTIONAL STUDENTS 172, 172-73 (Keisa Kay ed., 2000). Although there was no definitive
diagnosis given during Einstein's lifetime, it is relatively accepted that Einstein's behavior was
indicative of the twice-exceptional student. Id. Kay further theorizes, "[n]ew research into the
structure of Einstein's brain reveals neurological anomalies that indicate twice exceptionality." Id.
at 172.
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private schooling, or various special accommodations provided by the
district and delivered to the student at the local school.
193
The Einsteins are quite likely to prevail in their request for
accommodations for Albert's unique needs. In Borough of Palmyra, Board
of Education v. F. C., 194 parents claimed the school district failed to offer
their child FAPE; as a result, the parents removed their child from the public
school, placed him in a private school and requested reimbursement for the
expense.' 95 The court found for the parents, explaining that the legislative
intent, the clear meaning of the statute, and prior court holdings all
demanded that schools make reasonable accommodations to provide FAPE
to a qualified disabled student, even if it meant modifications to the school
or placement of the student in private school at district expense. 196
Additionally, in Palmyra, the court specifically disallowed any
budgetary argument the district might have had, stating, "[t]he Board's
calculus of financial harm presents a misleading dichotomy, since the
alternative to placement at [the private school] is not a zero expenditure, but
rather the commitment of other Board resources to fulfilling the Act's
mandate of an appropriate education for F.C."'197  Thus, the rational basis
test, and its corresponding budgetary-based argument, which is likely to
cause the Einstein's argument to fail on an equal protection claim, will not
be problematic for a Section 504 based claim.
193. See Perry A. Zirkel, Section 504 and the ADA: The Top Ten Recent Concepts/Cases, 147
WEST EDUC. L. REP. 761, 763 (2000) [hereinafter Zirkel, Top 10]; see also W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d
484, 494 (3d Cir. 1995) (examining the types and availability of damages to plaintiffs with Section
504 claims).
194. 2 F. Supp. 2d 637 (D.N.J. 1998).
195. Id. at 639-40. The C Family prevailed in their hearing before the administrative law judge,
and the district was ordered to both reimburse the C's for the money originally expended and to pay
the outstanding balance directly to the private school. Id. at 639-40.
196. See Palmyra, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 642. The court explained that when Section 504 applies,
schools must "'provide a free appropriate education to [] qualified handicapped [students].
(quoting Matula, 67 F. 3d at 492-93). The court further explained that:
Such free education "may consist either of the provision of free services or, if a recipient
places a handicapped person in or refers such person to a program not operated by the
recipient as its means of carrying out the requirements of this subpart, of payment for the
costs of the program."
Palmyra, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 642 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(c)(1)). In explaining the degree of
deference that should be given to legislative intent, the court acknowledged that "[Section 504's]
regulations particularly merit deference in the present case: the congressional committees
participated in their formulation, and both these committees and Congress itself endorsed the
regulations in their final form." Palmyra, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 642 (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634 (1984)).
197. Palmyra, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 644.
Similarly, since it is likely that Albert will be identified as gifted,' 98 if
the Einsteins reside in a state where the public school code and regulations
require schools to provide gifted education, Albert will likely qualify to
receive services and programming at an accelerated educational level.199 In
Centennial School District v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department
of Education,20 0 the court held that where the State Board of Education
mandated the specialized education of gifted students, the districts must
supply "mentally gifted students... with a plan of individualized instruction
(an 'appropriate program') designed to meet the 'unique needs of the
child. ',20l
Further, in Central York School District v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Department of Education, the court held that when the district
198. As a child, Einstein was fascinated by mathematics, science and nature, and taught himself
Euclidean geometry when he was just twelve years old. MSN ENCARTA, http://encarta.msn.com/
encyclopedia_761562147/EinsteinAlbert.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006). Given Albert's
childhood behaviors, it is most likely that Albert would be classified as a gifted underachiever. See
Kay, supra note 192, at 172-73. It should be noted that parents of twice-exceptional children who
have not yet been identified as gifted would need to procure an intelligence evaluation that would
comply with the requirements of their state and local school districts. This would especially be true
for the "identified special education student" and the "overlooked general education student." See
supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
199. Pennsylvania, for example, has identified public education as both a statutory right, as well
as a state constitutional right. See, e.g., 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §5-501(1) (West 1992) ("Right to public
education in Pennsylvania is statutory right, and, as such, is limited by statutory provisions." (citing
O'Leary v. Wisecup, 364 A.2d 770 (1976))); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5-502 (West 1992) (noting that
Pennsylvania "Const. Art. 3, § 14, "requires that the General Assembly provide for the maintenance
and support of a public education system."). Pennsylvania further defines "'children with
exceptionalities' as "children of school age who have a disability or who are gifted and who, by
reason thereof, need specially designed instruction." 24 PA. STAT. ANN.§ 13-1371(1) (West 1992
Supp. 2005). In addition to Pennsylvania, a few other states - Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, Tennessee and West Virginia - have laws "that approach the strength and specificity
of... the IDEA." Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Gifted Education: An Overview of the Legislation
and Regulations, 27 ROEPER REVIEW 228, 229 (2005) [hereinafter Zirkel, State Laws]. However,
although a majority of states define gifted education, and many even have funding and specific
educational responsibilities, most states do not have statutory protections and/or due process rights
for dispute resolution. Id. at 229-30.
200. 539 A.2d 785 (Pa. 1988)
201. Id. at 789. The court further defined the elements as follows:
Appropriate program-A program of education or training for exceptional school-aged
persons which meets their individual needs as agreed to by a parent, school district or
intermediate unit personnel; or as ordered by a hearing officer; or upon appeal as ordered
by the Secretary of Education.
Exceptional persons-Persons of school-age who deviate from the average in physical,
mental, emotional or social characteristics to such an extent that they require special
educational programs, facilities or services and shall include school-aged persons in
detention homes and State schools and hospitals.
... Gifted and talented school-aged persons-Those who, in accordance with criteria
prescribed in standards developed by the Secretary of Education, have outstanding
intellectual or creative ability, the development of which requires special activities or
services not ordinarily provided to regular children by local educational agencies.
Id. at 789 (citing Pa. Code § 13.1).
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and/or school is required to supply gifted programming to a qualified
student, the district cannot deprive that student of the programming because
of budgetary constraints and/or lack of financial resources.20 2 Accordingly,
if a particular state's education code mandated services for gifted education,
any argument the district might make based on budgetary concerns would
likely fail here as well.
Accordingly, Albert would likely be identified as eligible for gifted
education under the state statutes and he would also be entitled to special
education accommodations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. As an "otherwise qualified" student for both programs, but for the
ramifications of being twice-exceptional, Albert should be able to obtain
services from both programs.20 3
V. CONCLUSION
When the level of expectation for performance is high, children respond
to the challenge; however, when the bar is low, underachievement is the
202. 399 A.2d 167, 168-69 (Pa. 1979). The Court explained that:
We agree with the Secretary of Education that this provision does not make State
reimbursement a condition precedent to the duty of school districts to provide special
education for exceptional students required by Section 1372. To the contrary, we believe
that the School District's duty set forth in Section 1372 to establish an educational
program for the gifted is mandatory and a condition to its right to receive reimbursement
from the Commonwealth.
Id. The court further emphasized, "'[tihe District's duty to provide appropriate educational services
in accordance with a plan, and the Superintendent's duty to enforce that obligation, are not
contingent upon the Legislature's full funding of reimbursable costs or upon the Superintendent's
approval of the District's budget request."' Id. (citing Fredrick L. v. Thomas, 419 F. Supp. 960, 974-
75 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).
203. See Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369 (8th Cir. 1996). Tracy Schramm was a
gifted high school student who suffered from cerebral palsy and had been receiving services under
the IDEA as a result of her disability. Id. at 1370-71. Tracy's high school only required that
students complete two years of physical education class. Id. at 1371. Because Tracy's disability did
not impact her academic performance, upon completion of Tracy's second year of physical
education, the district determined that Tracy no longer required an IEP and was no longer eligible
under the IDEA. Id. Although Tracy ultimately prevailed in her claim for services and was able to
reinstate her IEP under the IDEA, the court acknowledged that:
Although an individual who is eligible for services under IDEA may also qualify for
assistance under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the school district must comply with
both statutes. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination on the basis
of handicap in a variety of programs and activities receiving federal aid ... Both § 504
and IDEA have been interpreted as requiring states to provide a free appropriate public
education to qualified handicapped persons ... Under the statutory scheme, the school
district is not free to choose which statute it prefers, as Yankton School District
acknowledges in its reply brief.
Id. at 1376 (citation omitted).
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result.204 In 1994, the United States Department of Education stated,
"[i]eaming is cumulative; all students, including the gifted, develop to their
full potential only when their special strengths are identified and supported
throughout their lives. 20 5
For more than thirty years, America has worked to improve the
educational opportunities for its disabled youth and for its gifted youth in
order to help them develop that "full potential. 2 6  Unfortunately, what
America has neglected to address was its disabled gifted youth.2 7 In doing
so, the government is potentially depriving the twice-exceptional child, the
child's family, and, one could argue, America itself, from the benefits that
child could bring to society.
America, on both the federal and state level has the ability to remedy
this wrong - it has procedures, statutes and laws that identify, assist, and
educate the disabled student. Similarly, it has procedures in place to identify
and educate gifted students. Additionally, through the statutory protections
afforded all Americans under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
it has the ability to combine these procedures to properly and sufficiently
identify and educate the twice-exceptional child.20 8 Quite simply, it can be
done. Do you want to be the government that overlooks the next Albert
Einstein, or do you want to be the government that produces Cadillac
educations?
Kim Millman 21
9
204. See PAT O'CONNELL Ross, PROJECT DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION - OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, NATIONAL EXCELLENCE: A
CASE FOR DEVELOPING AMERICA'S TALENT, PART I (1993), available at www.ed.gov/pubs/
DevTalent/toc.html.
205. Id.
206. See supra Part II.
207. See supra Part III.
208. See supra Part IV.
209. Dedication: J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law, December 2006. This
comment is dedicated to my very own twice-exceptional child, Scot Bujarski, whose ability to adapt
to and work with his own giftedness and dyslexia never ceases to impress and amaze me. His
difficulties and his successes were truly the inspiration for my exploration into the legal challenges
in this area. I would also like to thank my family; my husband Ron Bujarski, my sons Spencer, Scot
and Sean, and my mother, Mary Millman for their never-ending love, support and patience for my
"disappearing into the cave" of law school.
